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ABSTRACT 
The rise of the #MeToo Movement highlights the inadequacies of Title 
VII, the federal law that protects against employment discrimination, in-
cluding sex harassment. Title VII, in its current form, does not adequately 
address the needs of workers, especially low-wage workers, who already 
face considerable obstacles to reporting their harassment. While states 
have made significant strides in this area, the work of advocates for change 
and for survivors, like the TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund and the Nation-
al Women’s Law Center, is necessary so that the federal government fol-
lows suit to ensure Title VII works for all workers. In this article, we posit 
that changes need to be made to the time restrictions for filing Title VII 
claims, the severe or pervasive standard needs to be recalibrated to 
acknowledge the significant harassment workers face, the damages cap in 
Title VII should be adjusted for inflation to truly compensate survivors and 
discourage future misconduct by employers, mandatory nondisclosure 
agreements should be curtailed to stop silencing survivors, and the retalia-
tion framework needs to place a greater burden on the employer. Until such 
a time as these changes are made and sexual harassment in the workplace 
becomes a thing of the past, the TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund will con-
tinue to provide advocacy services to low-wage workers in order to help 
them achieve workplaces that are safe and respectful.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 “Jennifer” worked at a fast food restaurant. A cook at her job regularly 
tried to kiss and grope her. She asked him to stop, but the cook kept texting 
her inappropriate messages, asking her to send him pictures while he was in 
the shower. When Jennifer reported the sexual harassment to her employer, 
she was told to “shut up” and to “drop it.” The owner then called her a liar, 
and told her to stop talking about the harassment, because the “restaurant is 
how he feeds his family.” The owner then cut her hours and hired a differ-
ent woman to replace her. 
We know Jennifer’s story because she, like thousands of other women, 
reached out to the TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund. The TIME’S UP Legal 
Defense Fund helps individuals who experience sexual harassment and re-
lated retaliation at work or in their careers connect with legal and public re-
lations assistance1 In select cases, the Fund also helps to defray legal and 
                                                
1 About TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., 
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public relations costs for people challenging the harassment they have expe-
rienced.2 
The TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund is the first fund of any kind fo-
cused solely on helping with workplace sexual harassment cases.3 The initi-
ative was spearheaded by individuals in the entertainment industry, attor-
neys Tina Tchen, Roberta Kaplan, and Fatima Goss Graves, and public 
relations professional Hilary Rosen.4 Women in Hollywood came together 
around their own experience of harassment and assault and were moved by 
the outpouring of support and solidarity against sexual harassment from 
women across sectors. In particular a letter written by and on behalf of 
700,000 farm worker women to the women of Hollywood5 helped inspire 
them to help create a fund to help survivors of sexual harassment and retali-
ation in all industries—especially low-income women and people of color.6 
They worked together to achieve a historic first: to design a structure that 
would be both inclusive and effective. Through the Fund, workers gain 
“[a]ccess to prompt and comprehensive legal and communications help 
[which] will empower individuals and help fuel long-term systemic 
change.”7 The Fund is housed and administered by the National Women’s 
Law Center Fund. The National Women’s Law Center is long-time leader 
in the fight for policies and laws that improve the lives of women and girls.  
The TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund helps people in two separate but 
interconnected ways. First, we connect individuals who have faced work-
place sexual harassment and assault with attorneys in their geographic area 
through our intake process.8 These attorneys agree to do a first consultation 
with people coming through our network for free. There are more than 800 
attorneys in the network who have committed to providing these pro bono 
consultations and working with the Fund.9 During that initial consultation, 
                                                                                                             
https://nwlc.org/times-up-legal-defense-fund/about-times-up-legal-defense-fund/ 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2018) [hereinafter About TIME’S UP].  
2 Funding is only available in select cases based on criteria and availability of 
funds. Id. 
3 See id. 
4 Id. 
5 Letter from Alianza Nacional de Campesinas to Hollywood Actors (Nov. 10, 
2018), in TIME Staff, 700,000 Female Farmworkers Say They Stand With 
Hollywood Actors Against Sexual Assault, TIME (Nov. 10, 2017), 
http://time.com/5018813/farmworkers-solidarity-hollywood-sexual-assault/. 
6 About TIME’S UP, supra note 1. 
7 Id.  
8 Where to Get Help, TIME’S UP NOW, https://www.timesupnow.com/home#facts-
anchor (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). 
9 TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund - Stats & Numbers, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. 
(Oct. 9, 2018), https://nwlc.org/resources/times-up-legal-defense-fund-stats-
numbers/ [hereinafter TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund Stats & Numbers]. 
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the attorney lays out the legal options for an individual seeking help. Se-
cond, we help fund investigations and cases of workplace harassment and 
related retaliation.10 Attorneys can apply to us for funding either when they 
have agreed to take the case or if they are considering it.11 We fund both af-
firmative discrimination cases and cases involving defamation or the threat 
of defamation for speaking out.12 We help pay for both attorney’s fees and 
costs of the litigation.13 Finally, we offer assistance with media and story-
telling if that is part of what will help the individual.14  
Since its inception in January 2018, the Fund has responded to over 
4,000 requests for help from working people seeking assistance with sex 
discrimination, including and especially workplace sexual harassment and 
related retaliation.15 The Fund has received intakes from every state and 
from every industry. Approximately two-thirds of the individuals reaching 
out to us identify as low-income.16 Approximately one-third are women of 
color and nine percent identify as LGBTQ individuals.17 In March 2018, the 
Fund began to accept funding applications for cases.18 Since then, we have 
committed to funding over 100 cases totaling over six and a half million 
dollars.19 
Because of our work with the fund, we see numerous places where the 
federal anti-discrimination law, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(“Title VII”), fails to meet the needs of workers or the reality of their 
lives.20 Generally, Title VII prohibits discrimination against employees and 
applicants on the basis of sex, race, color, national origin, and religion.21 It 
is also illegal to retaliate against an individual who opposes practices made 
illegal under the statute or participates in an investigation under the stat-
                                                
10 TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., 
https://nwlc.org/times-up-legal-defense-fund/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2018). 
11 NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., APPLICATION FOR FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR LEGAL 
REPRESENTATION 1 (2018), https://nwlc-ciw49tixgw5lbab.stackpathdns.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/TULDF-Attorney-Funding-Application.docx. 
12 TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund Stats & Numbers, supra note 9. 
13 NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., supra note 11, at 1. 
14 TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund Stats & Numbers, supra note 9. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18Frequently Asked Questions, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., 
http://www.nwlc.org/times-up-legal-defense-fund/frequently-asked-questions-
about-the-times-up-legal-defense-fund-and-the-legal-network-for-gender-equity/ 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2018). 
19 TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund Stats & Numbers, supra note 9. 
20 See Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a 
Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 905 (2008) (discussing the short-
comings of Title VII protections in practice). 
21 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (2018). 
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ute.22 Moreover, Title VII only applies to employers with fifteen or more 
employees.23 
Although not discussed in detail in this article, one of the primary chang-
es necessary in Title VII is an increase in coverage. Some courts have al-
ready ruled that the statute covers discrimination based on sexual orienta-
tion and gender identity; the rest of the circuits should follow this lead.24 
The statute also needs to cover independent contractors as contracting is a 
growing area of the workforce that has very few employment protections. 
Workers who are independent contractors may have nowhere to turn if they 
are sexually harassed or otherwise discriminated against at work, even 
though they may look like and do the same work as “regular” employees.25 
Some states have amended their laws to allow for coverage of independent 
contractors,26 and the federal government should do the same. Finally, Title 
VII only applies to employers with fifteen or more employees. Millions of 
workers are employed by small businesses and cannot use Title VII’s pro-
tections. Again, some states provide more protection,27 and this should be 
the norm. For other workers, however, if they sue their employers for sexu-
al harassment, their only recourse is state law tort actions which may have a 
higher legal standard.   
This article outlines many of the obstacles, aside from lack of coverage, 
that individuals face when attempting to bring a workplace sexual assault or 
sexual harassment claim. First, Part I of this article examines the strict time 
limits surrounding potential sexual harassment claims and why they are un-
realistic for many employees. Part II outlines the current severe or pervasive 
standard for sexual harassment charges that claimants must satisfy. It dis-
cusses what the standard requires, how it has been applied to permit egre-
gious workplace conduct, the impact that this has on potential claimants, 
and state efforts to obtain true justice under the standard. Next, Part III ex-
plains Title VII’s cap on the damages a plaintiff can receive and the barriers 
                                                
22 Laws Enforced by EEOC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/law/statutes/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 2018). 
23 Questions and Answers, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/qa_domestic_violence.cfm (last visited 
Nov. 18, 2018). 
24 See, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, 833 F.3d 100, 112–13 (2d Cir. 2018); EEOC 
v. R.G., 884 F.3d 560, 571 (6th Cir. 2018). 
25 MAYA RAGHU & JOANNA SURIANI, NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., 
#METOOWHATNEXT: STRENGTHENING WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
PROTECTIONS AND ACCOUNTABILITY 2 (2017),  
https://nwlc-ciw49tixgw5lbab.stackpathdns.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/MeToo-Strengthening-Workplace-Sexual-Harassment-
Protections.pdf. 
26 Id at 2–4. 
27 Id. at 2. 
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these caps pose to adequate recovery. Non-disclosure agreements and the 
intentional silencing of victims are discussed in Part IV. Finally, Part V ad-
dresses the retaliation that many employees face when they do choose to 
come forward. 
I. STRICT TIME LIMITS 
“Angela” worked for over twenty years at the same restaurant and was 
constantly harassed. The owner would grab her breasts and make disgusting 
remarks. She quit after one of her children begged her not to go back be-
cause she saw the toll it was taking on her. She went from earning $500 a 
week to earning nothing. She was out of work for two years. She reached 
out to the TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund because she was inspired by the 
#MeToo Movement and wanted to speak up.    
Unfortunately for Angela her ability to seek legal redress is very limited. 
Under federal law, Angela had to file a charge with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within either 180 or 300 days of her har-
assment.28 Whether a potential plaintiff has 180 or 300 days to file a charge 
depends whether there are state laws that also cover the same type of har-
assment; if there are, the longer time limit (300 days) applies.29 For harass-
ment charges, all that is necessary is that one act of harassment be within 
the 180 or 300 days; for other types of Title VII claims, however, different 
rules apply.30 As the EEOC’s own website says, “[f]iguring out how much 
time you have to file a charge is complicated.”31 
After the charge is filled with the EEOC, the administrative process 
starts. It takes, on average, about ten months for the EEOC to investigate a 
charge,32 although some investigations can take significantly longer. Once 
that process is over, and if the EEOC decides not to take the case, the work-
er has ninety days to file a lawsuit or the courthouse doors close.33   
The strict time limits mean that it is exceptionally more difficult for 
workers to meet the procedural requirements for filing a charge with the 
EEOC. First, as the outpouring of support for Dr. Christine Blasey Ford 
                                                
28 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(e)(1) (2018). 
29 Id. 
30 Id.; Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002). 
31 Time Limits for Filing A Charge, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/timeliness.cfm (last visited Sept. 13, 2018). 
32 What You Can Expect After You File a Charge, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/timeliness.cfm (last visited Sept. 
13, 2018). 
33 Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm (last visited Nov. 23, 2018). 
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showed, people frequently do not report sexual harassment or assault at the 
time that it happens.34 There are numerous reasons why workers delay in 
coming forward to report sexual harassment including the time it can take 
for a person to process the trauma and be able to speak about it and report 
it, shame, fear of suffering a pay cut or other employment action as a con-
sequence of speaking out, fear of being seen as oversensitive or a trouble-
maker, lack of information, fear of seeming irrational, fear of losing rela-
tionships with co-workers, and fear of admitting that they have been placed 
in a vulnerable position.35  
In addition to all of the psychological reasons that cause workers to delay 
coming forward, finding lawyers, especially for low-wage workers, is a 
daunting task especially if the worker only has ninety days to do so. The 
worker has to find the name of a lawyer, find a time to call, and in all likeli-
hood has to leave a message and play phone tag with the lawyer until the 
meeting. This is all while working one or two or three jobs – jobs that prob-
ably do not allow unlimited breaks or access to a private phone line. Add to 
that other scheduling difficulties such as transportation and child care, and 
simply finding a lawyer may be too much of a burden for a worker. If the 
worker does manage to connect to a lawyer, the lawyer may not be interest-
ed in a case brought by a low-wage worker because the damages under Title 
VII may not be high enough to make the case worthwhile. And, of course, 
lawyers need to be paid. Even with resources like TIME’S UP Legal De-
fense Fund, which can give a person a list of lawyers in the area who are 
                                                
34 See, e.g., Daryl Hannah (@dhlovelife), TWITTER (Sept. 21, 2018), 
https://twitter.com/dhlovelife/status/1043177356142305280 (“I did, it didn’t mat-
ter, I was dismissed, disparaged, and I still get blamed. #WhyIDidntReport”); Lili 
Reinhart (@lilireinhart), TWITTER (Sept. 21, 2018), 
https://twitter.com/lilireinhart/status/1043285620087373824 (“Because I didn’t 
want to lose my job or make people think I was a drama queen. #WhyIDid-
ntReport”). See generally #WhyIDidntReport, TWITTER, 
https://twitter.com/search?q=%23whyididntreport&src=typd (compiling the many 
different reasons why people decided not to report their sexual assaults). 
35 See AMANDA ROSSIE ET AL., NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., OUT OF THE SHADOWS: 
AN ANALYSIS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT CHARGES FILED BY WORKING WOMEN 2 
(2018), https://nwlc-ciw49tixgw5lbab.stackpathdns.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/SexualHarassmentReport.pdf; L. Camille Hebert, Why 
Don’t “Reasonable Women” Complain About Sexual Harassment?, 82 IND. L.J. 
711, 731 (2007) (discussing the many reasons why women do not report); Justine 
E. Tinkler, Resisting the Enforcement of Sexual Harassment Law, 37 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 1, 4 (2012) (discussing the reasons why women do not actually define 
workplace sexual harassment as workplace sexual harassment); Louise F. Fitzger-
ald et al., Why Didn’t She Just Report Him? The Psychological and Legal Implica-
tions of Women’s Responses to Sexual Harassment, 51 J. SOC. ISSUES 117, 118 
(1995).  
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willing to at least do an initial meeting with the worker and help fund cer-
tain cases,36 too many people simply cannot make this deadline.   
A worker who misses the 180 or 300 day deadline to file with the EEOC 
or the ninety day deadline to file suit, may find the courthouse doors per-
manently closed to them because courts are very unlikely to toll these lim-
its.37 For example, in a recent Virginia sexual harassment case, the court re-
fused to toll the filing deadline even though the plaintiff suffered from post-
traumatic stress disorder from abuse she had faced as a child.38 In that case, 
the plaintiff, a school administrator, claimed a member of the school board 
repeatedly sexually harassed her including by telling her she would never 
become a superintendent unless she had sex with him.39 She refused and 
was rejected for the position of superintendent twice.40 She filed her charge 
the year after her second rejection – at most sixty-five days after her second 
rejection.41 The court rejected her claim as untimely, relying on the stand-
ard that tolling of the time period could only occur for “exceptional circum-
stances” and that if the plaintiff claimed that her PTSD was the reason, the 
she had to show that her condition prevented her from understanding and 
maintaining her affairs generally.42 The court then turned the plaintiff’s 
own claim against her, stating that she could not possible meet the standard 
necessary for tolling the time period because she claimed she was capable 
of being the superintendent of a school.43   
 
                                                
36 Legal Help, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR., https://nwlc.org/legal-assistance/ (last vis-
ited Nov. 24, 2018). 
37 Amtrak v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002) (stating that equitable doctrines 
such as tolling or estoppel should be applied sparingly in Title VII claims); Crane 
v. Shulkin, 293 F. Supp. 3d 352, 359 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (stating that “[t]hese timing 
requirements, though not jurisdictional, ‘are not to be disregarded by courts out of a 
vague sympathy for particular litigants.’”); Horsey v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 170 F. 
Supp. 3d 256, 264–65 (D.D.C. 2016) (“It is well established that the plaintiff-
employee ‘who fails to comply to the letter, with administrative deadlines ordinari-
ly will be denied a judicial audience.’”). 
38 Elitharp-Martin v. Pulaski Cty. Sch. Bd., 62 F. Supp. 3d 515, 520–21 (W.D. Va. 
2014); see also Carter v. Barker, No. 99-1433, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17600, at 
*33 (4th Cir. July 21, 2000) (charge untimely where harasser-supervisor who had 
sexually assaulted the worker asked the worker not to file charge and worker did 
not until after the 180 days because the harasser’s statement “took the form of re-
quests and not threats.”). 
39 Elitharp-Martin, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 517. 
40 Id. at 517–18. 
41 See id. 
42 Id. at 520–21. 
43 Id. at 521. 
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II. THE LEGAL STANDARD: SEVERE OR PERVASIVE  
Title VII has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to contain a severe 
or pervasive standard for workplace sexual harassment claims. This means 
that in order for a court to find that behavior is unlawful, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the harassment they experienced is severe or pervasive 
enough that it “create[s] a work environment that a reasonable person 
would consider intimidating, hostile, or abusive.”44 Courts, though, have 
inconsistently applied this standard, often allowing egregious conduct to go 
unchecked. However, some cities like New York City and states like Cali-
fornia, are enacting new policies to change or clarify the standard in order 
to ensure victims of sexual harassment have access to legal redress. 
A. What is Required?  
Amending the court-created “severe or pervasive” standard is among the 
essential improvements to federal anti-discrimination law necessary to en-
sure that those who experience sex harassment at work are able to prevail in 
court. Title VII itself does not use the words “severe or pervasive.”45 Ra-
ther, the standard was first widely adopted twenty-two years after the pas-
sage of the Civil Rights Act in a landmark 1986 Supreme Court decision, 
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson which held that, alongside quid pro quo46 
sex harassment, “hostile work environment” sexual harassment is a form of 
sex discrimination actionable under Title VII.47 In other words, to be ac-
tionable, sexually harassing behavior must be “sufficiently severe or perva-
sive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abu-
sive working environment.’”48    
The Plaintiff in Meritor, Mechelle Vinson, was an African-American 
woman who lived and worked in Washington, D.C.. She suffered shocking 
sexual harassment at the hands of her supervisor over a four-year time peri-
od, including 40 to 50 instances of rape,49 accompanied by groping, de-
                                                
44 Harassment, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/harassment.cfm (last visited March 24, 2019). 
45 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(a) (2018).  
46 29 C.F.R § 1604.11(a)(2) (defining quid pro quo sex harassment as "submission 
to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment 
decisions affecting such individual."). 
47 Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).  
48 Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(stating that “[w]hether sexual harassment at the workplace is sufficiently severe 
and persistent to affect seriously the psychological well being of employees is a 
question to be determined with regard to the totality of the circumstances.”)). 
49 See id. at 59-60. In Meritor, the Court uses both the words “intercourse” and 
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mands for sexual favors, and instances in which the supervisor followed her 
into the bathroom and exposed himself.50 In Justice Rehnquist’s decision, 
he called the behavior of Ms. Vinson’s supervisor, “plainly sufficient” to 
reach the definition of hostile work environment sexual harassment.51 How-
ever, not all instances of hostile work environment sexual harassment are as 
clear-cut.  
For example, in 1993, the Court further refined the standard in Harris v. 
Forklift Sys., Inc.52 The Plaintiff, Theresa Harris, worked as a manager at an 
equipment rental company for approximately two years. She sued after the 
president of the company, Charles Hardy, insulted her gender and targeted 
her with unwanted sexual innuendo.53 The lower court dismissed her case, 
concluding that although her harassment was offensive, it was not so severe 
as to seriously psychologically affect Harris’s well-being. Harris appealed, 
and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court. The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split over whether a plaintiff 
must have suffered harm that seriously affected their psychological well-
being to prevail in their claim.54 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice 
O’Connor clarified that harassment may satisfy the severe or pervasive 
standard without seriously affecting the victim’s psychological well-
being.55 In doing so, the Court affirmed severe or pervasive as the standard 
for hostile work environment sexual harassment and clarified the test for 
                                                                                                             
“rape” in the decision, preferring to distinguish instances of “voluntary” intercourse 
from forcible rape. See id. at 60. However, it is clear from the case that her supervi-
sor forced sexual contact with Ms. Vinson, including instances in which interac-
tions may not have been “forcible.” Ms. Vinson complied with her supervisor’s ad-
vances because she feared losing her job and suffering other forms of retaliation. 
Id. As such, I will not distinguish between instances of unwelcome sexual inter-
course and have chosen to only use the word “rape” to describe such events. As de-
fined by Merriam-Webster, rape is, “usually sexual intercourse carried out forci-
bly or under threat of injury against a person's will or with a person who is… 
incapable of valid consent because of… deception.” Definition of Rape, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rape (last visit-
ed Nov. 16, 2018). 
50 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.  
51 Id. at 67.  
52 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993). 
53 Id. at 19. In addition to other unwelcome behavior, “Hardy told Harris on several 
occasions, in the presence of other employees, ‘You're a woman, what do you 
know’ and ‘We need a man as the rental manager’; at least once, he told her she 
was ‘a dumb ass woman.’ Again, in front of others, he suggested that the two of 
them ‘go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris'] raise.’ Hardy occasionally asked 
Harris and other female employees to get coins from his front pants pocket. He 
threw objects on the ground in front of Harris and other women and asked them to 
pick the objects up. He made sexual innuendos about Harris' and other women's 
clothing.” 
54 Id. at 20. 
55 Id. at 21-22. 
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assessing whether harassing conduct has reached a severe or pervasive lev-
el. To be actionable, the harassing conduct must create an “objectively hos-
tile or abusive work environment—an environment that a reasonable person 
would find hostile or abusive.”56 Further, the victim must “subjectively per-
ceive the environment to be abusive” in order to alter the conditions of an 
individual’s workplace and reach a Title VII violation.57 The Court addi-
tionally outlined a set of factors to assess whether or not behavior is action-
able when considering “all the circumstances,” including: “the frequency of 
the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening 
or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 
interferes with an employee's work performance.”58 On the issue of whether 
Harris had suffered sexual harassment, the Court reversed the Sixth Circuit 
and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the clarified 
standard.59   
As the justices acknowledged, “[t]his is not, and by its nature cannot be, 
a mathematically precise test.”60 Even Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, 
acknowledged the vague nature of the test outlined in Harris but conceded 
that he “[knew] of no alternative course” and joined the opinion.61 Indeed, 
in subsequent Supreme Court cases following Meritor and Harris the Court 
attempted to further define various elements of actionable hostile work en-
vironment sexual harassment claims. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Servs., Inc., the Court clarified that Title VII sex harassment includes in-
stances of same-sex sexual harassment and sexual harassment need not have 
“sexual content or connotations” or be “motivated by sexual desire” in or-
der to be illegal sex discrimination.62 Rather, a plaintiff may be subject to 
unlawful harassment where the harassment involves “such sex-specific and 
derogatory terms . . . as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by 
general hostility to the presence of [the plaintiff’s sex] in the workplace.”63 
In clarifying the reach of Title VII sexual harassment, however, the Court 
continued to caution that Title VII was not a “general civility code” and 
specified that the statute “does not reach genuine but innocuous differences 
in the ways men and women routinely interact with members of the same 
                                                
56 Id. at 21.  
57 Id. at 21–22.  
58 Id. at 23.  
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 22. 
61 Id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
62 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). 
63 Id.  
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sex and of the opposite sex…it forbids only behavior so objectively offen-
sive as to alter the ‘conditions’ of the victim's employment.”64  
Again, just two months after Oncale, the Court in Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton doubled down on cautioning that the severe or pervasive stand-
ard must be “sufficiently demanding” as to not transform Title VII into a 
“general civility code.”65 In that case Justice Souter, writing for the majori-
ty, outlined the difference between illegal sex harassment and “the sporadic 
use of abusive language, gender related jokes and occasional teasing,” stat-
ing that the Court had made clear that “conduct must be extreme to amount 
to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.”66 And in Clark 
Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, the Court declined to find sex harassment had 
occurred after the plaintiff was exposed to one sexually harassing com-
ment.67 The Court reiterated that “simple teasing, offhand comments, and 
isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discrimina-
tory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’”68  
In the 1998 Oncale decision, the Court tried to assure the public in dicta 
that “common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will 
enable courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or rough-
housing…and conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position 
would find severely hostile or abusive.”69 This sentiment has proved to be 
shortsighted when considered against the backdrop of the last thirty-odd 
years of case law interpreting and applying the severe or pervasive standard. 
Since the advent of the standard, courts have routinely failed to hold that 
fact patterns evidencing egregious sexual harassment meet the severe or 
pervasive standard for illegality under Title VII.70 The case law seems es-
pecially out of place in today’s climate of the #MeToo Movement. In the 
last year, a new reckoning has focused attention on the deeply entrenched 
nature of sexual harassment in the work lives of millions and the grave 
                                                
64 Id. at 81. 
65 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). 
66 Id. 
67 Clark Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001). 
68 Id. (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788). 
69 Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82. Some lower courts interpreted this statement that the 
conduct was to be interpreted as a “reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position” as 
a new reasonableness standard more specific than simply a “reasonable person” 
standard. D.C. BAR, CURRENT STATUS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIM SAND 
CASES 14 (2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/crsj/committee/dcbar
-current-status-of-sexual-harassment-claims-and-cases.authcheckdam.pdf.  
70 See Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246–47 (11th Cir. 1999); SANDRA 
F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS UNDERMINE 
DISCRIMINATION LAW 34–40 (2017). 
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damage it causes, both to the lives of individuals and to the fabric our socie-
ty as a whole. 
B. How Have Courts Applied the Severe or Pervasive Standard? 
Courts across the country lack a reliable metric for uniformly analyzing 
which conduct rises to level of “severe or pervasive.” As the Supreme Court 
has acknowledged there is no mathematically precise test or assessment to 
determine which standard meets the bar.71 While some behavior, like that 
suffered by Ms. Vinson in Meritor, illustrates a clear picture of what is both 
severe as well as pervasive (although only severe or pervasive is necessary), 
other fact patterns leave courts struggling to assess behavior.   
Considering this confusion, courts have adopted some troubling conven-
tions. While most people assume, based on common sense, that certain 
conduct may be illegal harassment, courts have held otherwise. One case, 
Brooks v. City of San Mateo, outlined what came to be known as the “single 
grope” rule, in which the Ninth Circuit held that a single incident where one 
employee groped another by touching her stomach and forcing his hand un-
derneath her bra to grope her breast was not hostile work environment sex-
ual harassment.72 The Ninth Circuit came to this conclusion in part, by rea-
soning that this was an “isolated incident.”73 In light of the #MeToo 
Movement the California legislature in 2018 passed a bill explicitly de-
nouncing this standard and clarifying that a single instance of harassment 
may create a triable issue. But for the last eighteen years, Ninth Circuit 
plaintiffs who suffered a "single instance” of groping faced an uphill battle 
set by bad precedent when seeking justice in the courts. And for Ninth Cir-
cuit plaintiffs outside of California, the Brooks case still presents a chal-
lenge to overcome.  
A trend central to the problem with the severe or pervasive standard is 
the way in which precedent operates to raise the bar for behavior to be con-
sidered sufficiently severe or pervasive. Over time, as progressively worse 
behavior escapes liability, it becomes increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to 
prevail. While precedent can be helpful, and even necessary for the legal 
system to operate, courts have repeatedly found outstandingly bad behavior 
                                                
71 Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. 
72 Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 921, 930 (9th Cir. 2000), abrogated 
by statute, S.B. 1300, 2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018). It is notable that despite this being 
described as an isolated incident in the opinion, the opinion also states that two oth-
er women had been subjected to similar treatment from the same employee, alt-
hough they did not report the misconduct at the time. Id. at 922.  
73 Id. at 927. 
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to not reach the severe or pervasive standard, citing their own previous cas-
es as justification.   
For example, in the Fifth Circuit case Barnett v. Boeing Co., Sonja Bar-
nett worked as a Procurement Agent at Boeing.74 Between 2004–2005, 
Barnett’s supervisor “leered at Barnett, touched her in sexually inappropri-
ate and unwelcome ways, and allegedly actively intimidated her after she 
complained of his actions by loitering outside the building where Barnett’s 
office was located.”75 The Fifth Circuit held that this behavior was not se-
vere or pervasive enough to be hostile work environment harassment be-
cause it did not “destroy her ability to succeed in the workplace environ-
ment.”76 In coming to its decision, the court compared the harassing 
behavior Ms. Barnett suffered to harassment inflicted upon women in prior 
cases where the court held that the harassing behavior was not severe or 
pervasive.77   
In one of the Fifth Circuit’s prior cases, Debra Jean Shepherd suffered 
harassing behavior over a period of two years perpetrated by a coworker. 
The behavior included: attempting to look down the plaintiff’s clothing; 
sexually suggestive comments including, “your elbows are the same color 
as your nipples” and “you have big thighs;” the harasser patting his lap and 
remarking, “here’s your seat” while the plaintiff was looking for a seat in a 
meeting; and unwanted touching, including touching the plaintiff’s arm and 
rubbing one of his hands from her shoulder to wrist.78 In another Fifth Cir-
cuit case that the court used to support the rejection of Ms. Barnett’s claim, 
Ladonna Hockman was harassed by Oscar Rogers, who ran a commercial 
printing press out of the same building where she worked.79 The case de-
tailed that in about a year and a half time-span, “Rogers…(1) once made a 
remark to Hockman about another employee's body, (2) he once slapped her 
on the behind with a newspaper, (3) he “grabbed or brushed” against 
Hockman's breasts and behind, (4) he once held her cheeks and tried to kiss 
her, (5) he asked Hockman to come to the office early so that they could be 
alone, and (6) he once stood in the door of the bathroom while she was 
washing her hands.”80 The court found this conduct not to be severe or per-
                                                
74 Barnett v. Boeing Co., 306 F. App'x 875, 876 (5th Cir. 2009). 
75 Id. at 879. 
76 Id. at 880. 
77 Hockman v. Westward Commc’ns, L.L.C., 407 F.3d 317, 321–22 (5th Cir. 
2004); Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir. 
1999). 
78 Shepherd, 168 F.3d at 872. 
79 Hockman, 407 F.3d at 321. 
80 Id. at 328. 
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vasive.81 In this way, Sonja Barnett was denied justice in the courts based in 
part of the fact that the court also declined to decide in favor of Debra Jean 
Shepherd and Ladonna Hockman.  
As another example, in Mitchell v. Pope, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a 
grant of summary judgment against Donya Mitchell, who was employed for 
four years as a Deputy Sheriff under the supervision of Major Michael 
Overbey.82 During those four years, she details sixteen separate incidents of 
harassment.83 In dismissing her claims, the court stated that the harassment 
she suffered was “not that frequent,” and Overbey “attempted to touch or 
did touch her…[o]nly three times.”84 In coming to its conclusion, the court 
compared the harassment that Mitchell suffered to previously decided Elev-
enth Circuit cases, Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents and Mendoza v. Borden, 
Inc., in which the court decided the behavior was not severe or pervasive. 
In Gupta, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a jury verdict finding that a male 
department coordinator, Rupert Rhodd, harassed a female associate profes-
                                                
81 Id. 
82 Mitchell v. Pope, 189 F. App'x 911, 914 (11th Cir. 2006).  
83 Conduct by her supervisor included that he: 
(1) tried to kiss her after the 1999 Sheriff's Department Christmas party and 
called her a “frigid bitch” when she refused, (2) showed up at places Plaintiff 
was “staking out” in December 1999 and told her “you must be working out” 
and “you sure do look fine,” (3) appeared several times in her driveway in 
January 2000, once drunk, when he told Plaintiff's son that he loved Plaintiff, 
(4) suggested she wear certain jeans and commented “your ass sure does look 
fine,” (5) told her “you can just walk into the room and I'd get an erection,” 
(6) stood on his tiptoes to look down her shirt, (7) rubbed up against her, 
whispered in her ear, and put his arm across her chest, (8) chased her around 
the…office, (9) once picked her up over his head in the…office, (10) asked 
her over the Sheriff's Department telephones if she was dressed or naked, 
(11) opened the door to the women's bathroom and turned the lights off and 
on when Plaintiff was inside, (12) simulated “humping” another female em-
ployee with that employee's consent, (13) made sexually derogatory remarks 
and gestures about a female magistrate judge, and (14) referred to Sheriff 
Pope as a “big eared pencil dick motherfucker.” [15] In March 2000, Plaintiff 
and Supervisor attended a conference in Alabama. Supervisor told Plaintiff 
that the hotel had made a mistake and that they would have to share a room. 
Overbey slept on the floor. [16] The next night, after Overbey got his own 
room, he tried to convince Plaintiff to go to the hotel hot tub with him and 
other conventioneers. He called her a “frigid bitch” when she refused; when 
she confronted him the next morning and threatened to tell the Sheriff if 
Overbey did not leave the conference, Overbey cried, promised he would be 
“good,” and left. [Additionally,] in June 2002, before she was scheduled to 
work security at a private golf tournament given by a strip club owner, 
Overbey told her and other officers about another golf tournament hosted by 
this owner where strippers acted as caddies. Overbey said that the owner di-
rected the strippers to place golf balls into their vaginas and to squirt them 
onto the green. 
Id. at 914 n. 3. 
84 Id. at 914 
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sor, Srabana Gupta, over a six or seven-month period.85 Gupta is a citizen 
of India and had applied for a tenure track position at the university.86 
Rhodd was the chairman of the search committee for the position, met her 
at the airport when she arrived, and helped her settle into her apartment.87 
The alleged harassment included Rhodd making flirtatious comments, such 
as “You are looking very beautiful” and “I can look at you and I can tell 
you are innocent and don’t have much [sexual] experience;” calling Gupta 
frequently at night and asking her questions including, “Are you in bed 
yet?” and “Are you talking to your boyfriend?;” placing his hand on her in-
ner thigh; touching her ring and bracelet; and lifting up the hem of her dress 
and asking, “What kind of material is this?”88 Once when he was expecting 
her in his office, she walked in and found “him sitting in his chair with no 
dress shirt on, but wearing an undershirt. When she entered his office, he 
grabbed his dress shirt, ‘unbuckled his belt and pulled down his zipper and 
start[ed] tucking his shirt in.’”89 The court in Gupta used the Eleventh Cir-
cuit analysis laid out in Mendoza to analyze the case and concluded that 
finding for Gupta would, “lower the bar of Title VII to punish mere bother-
some and uncomfortable conduct” that would “trivialize true instances of 
sexual harassment.”90 The court reversed the jury, concluding that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the jury finding. And in Mendoza, the court 
said that the Plaintiff, Red Mendoza, did not experience hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment when over a period of eleven months, her su-
pervisor “constantly watched her,” looked her up and down and followed 
her around. In two instances, while looking  her up and down, he  looked at 
her groin area and made a sniffing sound; in another instance he did not 
look at her but made a similar sniffing sound, and he once rubbed his right 
hip up against her left hip, touched her shoulders at the same time and when 
she gave him a startled look, smiled at her.91 When Mendoza finally con-
fronted her supervisor about his behavior, she told him, “I came here to 
work, period,” and he responded, “Yeah, I’m getting fired up too.”92 
Between Mendoza in 1999, Gupta in 2000, and Mitchell in 2006, it is 
particularly striking to see progressively more extreme behavior being 
thrown out as not sufficiently severe or pervasive. Fact patterns such as the-
                                                
85 Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 578–79 (11th Cir. 2000). 
86 Id. at 577. 
87 Id. at 578. 
88 Id. at 578–79. 
89 Id. at 585. 
90 Id. at 584 (quoting Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1246). 
91 Mendoza, 195 F.3d at 1243. 
92 Id. 
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se are, unfortunately, not the exception - they are closer to the norm. Appal-
ling sexual harassment regularly fails to meet the standard.93  
                                                
93 See, e.g., Rickard v. Swedish Match N. Am., Inc., 773 F.3d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 
2014) (affirming a grant of summary judgment and finding conduct not sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to satisfy the hostile work environment standard where on the 
same day, Plaintiff’s supervisor “grabbed and squeezed [Plaintiff’s] nipple and 
stated ‘this is a form of sexual harassment’” and on another occasion, “took a towel 
from [Plaintiff], ‘rubbed it on his own crotch,’ and gave ‘it back to [Plaintiff].’”); 
Guthrie v. Waffle House, Inc., 460 F. App'x 803, 805 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
a few dozen instances of harassment over an eleven-month period, including a co-
worker grabbing plaintiff’s butt two to five times, “talking dirty” to plaintiff, saying 
five times that he wanted to have sex with her and “lick” her “all over,” asking her 
on a date ten to twenty times, and saying that she “could just pee in his mouth,” 
along with plaintiff’s supervisor telling her that he “wanted to have her,” speaking 
openly about sex, kissing plaintiff on the cheek and saying that plaintiff could “shit 
in [his] mouth” over the course of a month did not constitute severe or pervasive 
harassment.); Anderson v. Family Dollar Stores, 579 F.3d 858, 864 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(holding that two months of the manager’s rubbing of Anderson's shoulders or back 
at times during her training session, calling Anderson “baby doll” during a tele-
phone conversation, accusing her of not wanting to be “one of my girls,” and his 
suggestion that she should be in bed with him and a Mai Tai in Florida, were not 
sufficiently severe or pervasive); Singleton v. Dep't of Corr. Educ., 115 F. App'x 
119, 120 (4th Cir. 2004) (affirming summary judgment for the employer and hold-
ing that harassment over a period of approximately one year was not sufficiently 
severe or pervasive, including when it, “occurred approximately four times a 
week,” contained comments such that Plaintiff “should be spanked every day;” in-
sistent compliments; one instance where the harasser stared at Plaintiff’s breasts; 
one occasion where, “he measured the length of her skirt to judge its compliance 
with the prison's dress code and told her that it looked ‘real good;’ constantly told 
her how attractive he found her; made references to his physical fitness…; asked 
[Plaintiff] if he made her nervous (she answered ‘yes’); and repeatedly remarked to 
[her] that if he had a wife as attractive as [the Plaintiff], he would not permit her to 
work in a prison facility around so many inmates.” Additional harassment included 
that the harasser “improperly requested access to [Plaintiff’s] leave records” and 
installed “a security camera…in her office in a way that permitted him to observe 
her as she worked, supposedly for safety reasons, but which did not permit him to 
observe the prison library or any interactions with inmates that she might have had 
while she was not sitting at her desk.”); Patt v. Family Health Sys., Inc., 280 F.3d 
749, 754 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that Plaintiff's complaints of eight gender-related 
comments during the course of her seven-year employment, including, “the only 
valuable thing to a woman is that she has breasts and a vagina,” was insufficient to 
demonstrate hostile work environment because “these comments were too isolated 
or sporadic to constitute severe or pervasive harassment.”); Sprague v. Thorn 
Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1365–66 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding five “sexually-
oriented, offensive” statements over sixteen months insufficient to show hostile en-
vironment, even though one of the harasser's statements occurred while he put his 
arm around Plaintiff, looked down her dress and said, “well, you got to get it when 
you can.”); Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc.,  104  F.3d  822, 823–24 (6th Cir. 1997) 
(reversing the jury verdict, including a $250,000 damages award, and finding con-
duct insufficiently severe or pervasive because it appeared to have been nothing 
more than “merely offensive.” Conduct over a four-month period involved repeated 
sexual jokes; one occasion of looking Plaintiff up and down, smiling and stating, 
there is “nothing I like more in the morning than sticky buns;” suggesting land area 
be named as “Titsville” or “Twin Peaks;” asking Plaintiff, “Say, weren't you there 
[at a biker bar] Saturday night dancing on the tables?;” stating, “Just get the broad 
17
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C. Why is it a Problem?  
As it now stands, the severe or pervasive standard is broken. Rather than 
acting as a reasonable test of liability, it has been interpreted over the years 
such that victims of workplace sexual harassment are largely unable to 
achieve justice through the laws created to protect them.94 
                                                                                                             
to sign it;” telling Plaintiff she was “paid great money for a woman;” laughing 
when Plaintiff mentioned the name of Dr. Paul Busam, apparently pronounced as 
“bosom.”);  Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745, 747 (4th Cir. 
1996) (concluding that although same-sex sexual harassment was actionable, the 
behavior Hopkins experienced was not severe or pervasive enough to be actionable 
because it was “sexually neutral or at most ambiguous” and “temporally diffuse” 
with “gaps between incidents as great as a year.” Over a seven year period, the su-
pervisor frequently entered the men’s bathroom when Plaintiff was there alone, in-
cluding one time when he pretended to lock the door and said, “Ah, alone at last,” 
while walking towards Plaintiff; writing “SWAK., kiss, kiss” and drawing hearts 
on internal mail Plaintiff received from his fiancé; asking him if he had gone on 
any dates over the weekend and whether he had sex with anyone; on one occasion 
pivoting an illuminated magnifying glass over Plaintiff’s crotch, looking through it 
while pushing the lens down and asking, “Where is it?;” bumping into Plaintiff and 
saying, “You only do that so you can touch me;” regularly commenting on Plain-
tiff’s appearance; while in a confined darkroom space together asking Plaintiff, 
“Was it as good for you as it was for me?” and then attempting to force himself into 
a revolving door with Plaintiff.); Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 
(7th Cir. 1995) (holding insufficiently severe or pervasive to support a hostile-
environment claim nine instances of offensive behavior over seven months includ-
ing repeated references to Plaintiff as a “tilly” and a “pretty girl;” one comment that 
the office was hot because she had entered it; and one instance referring to mastur-
bation. The Court reasoned that the behavior was merely, “distasteful to a sensitive 
woman.”); Weiss v. Coca–Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(holding Plaintiff's claims—that her supervisor repeatedly asked about her personal 
life; told her how beautiful she was; asked her on dates; called her a dumb blonde; 
put his hand on her shoulder at least six times; placed “I love you” signs in her 
work area; and tried to kiss her once at a bar and twice at work over a three-month 
period—were not sufficient for actionable sexual harassment because “these inci-
dents were also relatively isolated and no more serious” than in Scott v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 211–14 (7th Cir. 1986), in which the Plaintiff 
worked in an auto mechanic shop and was repeatedly propositioned; slapped on her 
butt on at least one occasion; and consistently received the response, “What will I 
get for it?” when asking her supervisor for assistance, among other incidents.); Sax-
ton v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,  10 F.3d 526, 528, 534 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding 
insufficient harassment to constitute a hostile work environment where over ap-
proximately a one-month period, Defendant supervisor placed his hand on Plain-
tiff’s leg above the knee and rubbed her upper thigh; forced a kiss on Plaintiff; and 
“lurched” at her in an attempt to grab her because his behavior was “relatively lim-
ited” and “did not rise to the level of pervasive harassment….”).  
94 See SPERINO & THOMAS, supra note 70, at 34–40, 130, 160; Justice for Victims: 
Re-Examining California’s Legal Standards for Sexual Harassment: Informational 
Hearing Before the Cal. S. Comm. on Judiciary & S. Select Comm. on Women, 
Families, & the Workplace (Jan. 11, 2018), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/Testimony_Commissioner_Malal
is-CA_Senate_Judiciary_Committee.pdf (testimony of Carmelyn P. Malalis, Chair 
& Commissioner of the NYC Commission on Human Rights). 
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Further, setting the bar unduly high creates the wrong deterrent, or very 
little deterrent to sexual harassment for employers. Rather than aspiring to a 
workplace where there is no sexual harassment, employers must only legal-
ly maintain a workplace where there is neither a severe nor a pervasive lev-
el of sexual harassment. This perverse incentive has “resulted in courts ‘as-
signing a significantly lower importance to the right to work in an 
atmosphere free from discrimination’ than other terms and conditions of 
work.”95  
D. How Are States And Cities Addressing the Problem?  
Given these serious concerns, advocates across the country are grappling 
with the most appropriate way to address judicial interpretations of “severe 
or pervasive” to ensure that the law provides redress to those who have ex-
perienced hostile work environment sexual harassment. Two strains of 
thought have risen to the fore. The first is to do away with the “severe or 
pervasive” standard language and start fresh. The second is to redefine the 
meaning of the standard, adding guardrails to the “severe or pervasive” lan-
guage to indicate expressly how the standard should and should not be in-
terpreted. 
Two recent legislative approaches from New York City and California 
provide useful examples. New York City has chosen to adopt new, less re-
strictive language. Namely, in New York City, a plaintiff can prove a viola-
tion of the New York City Human Rights Law if s/he can show that they 
were treated less well than other employees because of their gender.96 Cali-
fornia decided to keep the “severe or pervasive” language intact, but further 
defined how its courts should interpret the standard by expressly adopting 
and affirming certain decisions and abrogating others.97 
1. The New York City Approach  
In 2005, New York City passed the Local Civil Rights Restoration Act of 
200598 stating, “[i]t is the sense of the Council that New York City’s Hu-
man Rights Law has been construed too narrowly to ensure protection of 
                                                
95 Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 36 (App. Div. 2009). 
96 N.Y.C. LOCAL L. NO. 35, §2(c) (2005); N.Y.C. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 
COMBATING SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE: TRENDS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON 2017 PUBLIC HEARING TESTIMONY 3 (2018), 
https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/SexHarass_Report.pdf. 
97 S.B. 1300, 2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
98 N.Y.C. LOC. L. NO. 85 (2005).  
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the civil rights of all persons covered by the law.”99 The law’s explicit pur-
pose was to assert that the provisions of the New York City Human Rights 
Law (NYCHRL) were to be “construed independently from similar or iden-
tical provisions of New York state or federal statutes.”100 The federal and 
state laws were to serve as a floor below which the city laws should not 
fall.101 In Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., a case of first impression before a 
New York State Appellate Division Court, Judge Rolando T. Acosta dictat-
ed a new standard by which courts should analyze NYCHRL liability.102 
Rather than use the “severe or pervasive standard” the court adopted the fol-
lowing test: “the primary issue for a trier of fact in harassment cases, as in 
other terms-and-conditions cases, is whether the plaintiff has proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that she has been treated less well than other 
employees because of her gender.”103  
In coming to its conclusion, the court openly acknowledged that the “se-
vere or pervasive” standard had “sanctioned a significant spectrum of con-
duct demeaning to women” by “permitting a wide range of conduct to be 
found beneath the ‘severe or pervasive bar’” and thereby allowing discrimi-
nation “to play some significant role in the workplace” and “reduc[ing] the 
incentive for employers to create workplaces that have zero tolerance for 
conduct demeaning to a worker because of protected class status.”104 The 
Williams standard “maximizes the law's deterrent effect” given that “liabil-
ity is normally determined simply by the existence of differential treatment 
(i.e., unwanted gender-based conduct).”105 However, the court did clarify 
that while severity and pervasiveness could not be a measure for liability, 
they are applicable when considering the scope of damages.106 
Moreover, the Williams standard has since been adopted by New York 
state courts and upheld by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Mihalik 
v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc.107 In Mihalik, the Second Circuit 
vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendant 
                                                
99 Id. 
100 Id.; N.Y.C. Human Rights Law, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-101-107 (2005). 
101 N.Y.C. LOC. L. NO. 85 (2005).  
102 Williams, 872 N.Y.S.2d at 39. 
103 Id. (emphasis added). The court also acknowledged that this new standard was 
not to become a “general civility code” and recognized “an affirmative defense 
whereby defendants can still avoid liability if they prove that the conduct com-
plained of consists of nothing more than what a reasonable victim of discrimination 
would consider ‘petty slights and trivial inconveniences.’” Id. at 41. 
104 Id. at 38.  
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 See Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 105 (2d 
Cir. 2013). 
20
Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 8
https://scholarship.richmond.edu/pilr/vol22/iss2/8
Do Not Delete 4/26/19  12:31 PM 
2019] LEGAL CHANGES TO STRENGTHEN #METOO 257 
and remanded the case for trial.108 The case concerned Renee Mihalik, a 
woman working as a Vice President of an electronic equity trading compa-
ny selling products to institutional clients.109 Mihalik worked at the compa-
ny between July 2007 and April 2008, and she faced near-constant harass-
ment.110 Her workplace was a “boys-club” environment in which the male 
employees rated the appearance of their female colleagues, regularly 
watched porn at work, and talked about visiting strip clubs.111 After Mihalik 
twice rebuffed her employers’ offer that she spend the night with him at the 
company apartment, he began to retaliate against her, and ultimately fired 
her.112 Mihalik brought suit under the NYCHRL,113 but the district court, 
relying heavily on the dicta in Williams that the standard was not a “civility 
code,” held that Mihalik had presented only evidence of “sporadic insensi-
tive comments” rather than a hostile work environment actionable under the 
NYCHRL.114 
In reversing the decision, the Second Circuit analyzed the Williams 
standard and found that there was a genuine dispute as to whether Mihalik 
had been treated less well because of her gender.115 The Second Circuit crit-
icized the lower court’s outsized emphasis on the “not a civility code” dicta 
in Williams and found that although the district court properly acknowl-
edged the Williams standard, it did not correctly apply it.116   
The Williams standard was codified in 2016, when New York City 
passed a second Restoration Act, clarifying that Williams and several other 
cases had accurately reflected the liberal, broad, remedial purpose of the 
NYCHRL.117 
                                                
108 Id. at 117. 
109 Id. at 105. 
110 Id. at 105–06 (stating that, “[f]rom the moment Mihalik started, Peacock paid 
‘special attention’ to her, asking her about her relationship status and whether she 
preferred older men or was a ‘cougar.’ Immediately, Peacock asked Mihalik to 
make sure her travel arrangements for a business trip coincided with his so they 
could ‘enjoy traveling together’ and ‘get to know each other.’ He commented on 
her appearance often, telling her she looked ‘sexy’ and that her red shoes meant she 
was ‘promiscuous.’ When she wore certain outfits, he told her that she should 
‘dress like that every day. You might get more clients in turn.’ About two months 
after she started, he asked her if she ‘fanc[ied] dogging’ and then, when she did not 
know what that was, described the sex act to which he was referring. In response, 
Mihalik would always tell Peacock that his behavior was ‘inappropriate and unbe-
fitting a CEO.’”). 
111 Id. at 106. 
112 Id. at 106–07. 
113 Id. at 107. 
114 Id. at 108. 
115 Id. at 116. 
116 See id. at 116–17. 
117 N.Y.C. LOCAL L. NO. 35, §2(c) (2005); N.Y.C. COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 
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2. The California Approach 
On September 30, 2018, Governor Jerry Brown of California signed into 
law SB 1300, which among other things, expressly affirmed or rejected par-
ticular holdings in cases analyzing hostile work environment claims.118 In 
particular the bill does the following: 
• Adopts the standard in Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s concur-
rence in Harris: “the plaintiff need not prove that his or her tan-
gible productivity has declined as a result of the harassment. It 
suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to the dis-
criminatory conduct would find, as the plaintiff did, that the har-
assment so altered working conditions as to make it more diffi-
cult to do the job.”119  
• Rejects the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Brooks and establishes 
that a single instance of “harassing conduct” may create a “tria-
ble issue” if “the harassing conduct has unreasonably interfered 
with the plaintiff’s work performance or created an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive working environment.”120  
• Affirms the Reid v. Google, Inc. decision “in its rejection of the 
‘stray remarks doctrine’” and clarifies that a totality of the cir-
cumstances test should be used to assess the existence of a hos-
tile work environment.121 Further, “a discriminatory remark, 
even if not made directly in the context of an employment deci-
                                                                                                             
supra note 96, at 3. 
118 S.B. 1300, 2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
119 S.B. 1300, 2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018); Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concur-
ring). 
120 S.B. 1300, 2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018); Brooks, 229 F. 3d at 924–27. Notably, 
Brooks was written by disgraced former Judge Alex Kozinski who abruptly retired 
in late 2017 after more than a dozen allegations of sexual harassment by former 
clerks and other professional contacts. His harassment included groping, calling 
women into his chambers to show them pornography, and making sexually sugges-
tive comments. NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., NWLC REPORT: THE RECORD OF 
BRETT M. KAVANAUGH ON CRITICAL LEGAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN 20–21 
(2018), https://nwlc.org/resources/nwlc-report-on-the-record-of-brett-kavanaugh/. 
121 S.B. 1300, 2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018); Reid v. Google, Inc., 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 744, 
759 (Cal. 2007). The stray remarks doctrine refers to a line from Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence in the case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, stating that 
“stray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of sexual harass-
ment…cannot justify requiring the employer to prove that its hiring or promotion 
decisions were based on legitimate criteria. Nor can statements by non-decision 
makers, or statements by decision makers unrelated to the decisional process itself, 
suffice to satisfy the plaintiff’s burden in this regard.” Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). This had led to courts 
adopting inconsistent and unclear analysis for when a remark may be sufficient to 
evince employment discrimination. 
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sion or uttered by a non-decision maker, may be relevant, cir-
cumstantial evidence of discrimination.”122  
• Rejects any language, reasoning, or holding in Kelley v. Conco 
Companies, which would have the result of allowing the legal 
standard for sexual harassment to vary by workplace.123 Instead, 
the bill states that it is, “irrelevant that a particular occupation 
may have been characterized by a greater frequency of sexually 
related commentary or conduct in the past. In determining 
whether or not a hostile environment existed, courts should only 
consider the nature of the workplace when engaging in or wit-
nessing prurient conduct and commentary is integral to the per-
formance of the job duties.”124  
• Asserts that “harassment cases are rarely appropriate for disposi-
tion on summary judgment” and “affirms the decision in Nazir v. 
United Airlines, Inc…and its observation that hostile working 
environment cases involve issues ‘not determinable on pa-
per.’”125 
SB 1300 took effect on January 1, 2019.126 While it is too early to sub-
stantively analyze any effects of the changes to the ways in which Califor-
nia courts are now required to view hostile work environment claims, both 
these changes and the New York City changes constitute concrete progress 
towards a more appropriate standard of evaluation that will allow plaintiffs 
who have experienced hostile work environment sexual harassment to gain 
justice in the courts.  
III. CAPPED DAMAGES 
One of the reasons TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund helps to defray the 
costs of workplace sexual harassment cases for low-wage workers is that 
the damages in these cases in many states are set at such a low level that it 
is finically impossible to bring certain cases. Under Title VII, compensatory 
and punitive damages, the ones that are most likely in a sexual harassment 
                                                
122 S.B. 1300, 2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018); see Reid, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 759. 
123 S.B. 1300, 2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018); Kelley v. Conco Companies, 126 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 651, 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (stating that “the context in which [the accused’s] 
behavior occurred is significant.”). 
124 S.B. 1300, 2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
125 Id.; Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 296, 331 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2009).  
126 Laura Mahoney, California Makes It Easier to Bring Sexual Harassment 
Claims, BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.bna.com/california-
makes-easier-n73014482894/. 
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case, are strictly limited.127 Congress set the limitations in 1991; they are as 
follows: 
Congressional Limitations on Damages Based on Employer Size128 
Employer Size Amount 
15-101 $50,000 
100-201 $100,000 
200-500 $200,000 
More than 500 $300,000 
 
The limits have not been raised since 1991.129 Accounting for inflation, 
this is where they should be: 
Congressional Limitations on Damages Based on Employer Size Adjust-
ed for Inflation130 
Employer Size Amount 
15-100 $92,796 
100-200 $185,592 
200-500 $371,184 
More than 500 $556,775 
 
These caps apply to all types of Title VII claims – hiring, firing, and har-
assment.131 They are especially damaging to harassment claims, however, 
because compensatory and punitive damages are frequently the only type of 
damages available in harassment cases.132    
                                                
127 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2018). 
128 Id. 
129 See id. 
130 See id.; Lynn Ridgeway Zehrt, Twenty Years of Compromise: How the Caps on 
Damages in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Codified Sex Discrimination, 25 YALE J.L. 
FEMINISM 249, 251 (2013); CPI Inflation Calculator, OFFICIAL DATA, 
https://www.officialdata.org/1991-dollars-in-2018 (last visited Mar. 22, 2019) (en-
ter recovery cap amount into inflation calculator, select 1991 as the start year and 
2019 as the end year). 
131 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018). 
132 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2018). Title VII does allow for back and front pay, but 
that requires that the individual has lost a job or a promotion, which is not a usual 
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Leaving aside inflationary adjustment, the setting of compensatory and 
punitive damages based on the size of the employer is nonsensical. Com-
pensatory damages reflect the pain, suffering, and mental anguish endured 
by the plaintiff.133 That pain and suffering varies based on the actions of the 
harasser and the effect it had on the plaintiff. It does not vary with the size 
of the employer. Being grabbed, groped and assaulted does not hurt less be-
cause your employer has 200 employees instead of 500. Similarly, punitive 
damages punish an employer who acted “with malice or reckless indiffer-
ence” to federally protected rights.134 Again, the size of the employer has 
nothing to do with the amount of malice with which the employer acted.   
Second, the caps create perverse incentives where larger employers are 
not punished, nor are they incentivized to prevent harassment. 135 As one 
judge observed in an Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) case against 
Wal-Mart where the plaintiff was awarded the maximum amount of puni-
tive damages ($300,000), “it took Wal-Mart only 37 seconds last year to 
achieve sales equal to the $300,000 it must now pay Brady in punitive dam-
ages. There is no meaningful sense in which such an award can be consid-
ered a punishment.”136 The court noted that the lack of punishment was ev-
ident from the facts of the case. Despite being under a consent decree to 
settle prior ADA violations, Wal-Mart asked the plaintiff prohibited ques-
tions and the employees who testified had no knowledge of the policies 
Wal-Mart had agreed to disseminate as part of a settlement of another law-
suit.137 The better path here is what several states already provide: compen-
satory and punitive damages that vary with the facts of the case, rather than 
with arbitrary, outdated caps.138 
                                                                                                             
part of a harassment claim. Some federal race discrimination complaints can avoid 
the Title VII caps because they can be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 which does 
not have statutory caps. Sex discrimination, however, is not covered by § 1981. 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (2018). 
133 Id. at § 1981a(b)(3). 
134 Id. at § 1981a(b)(1). 
135 One recent study estimates that in order to act as a financial incentive to for 
companies to work to prevent harassment, the cap would need to be raised from 
$300,000 to $7.6 million. Joni Hersch, Valuing the Risk of Workplace Sexual Har-
assment, 57 J. Risk & Uncertainty 111, 112 (2018).  
136 Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. CV 03-3843(JO), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12151, at *11-12 (E.D.N.Y. June 21, 2005). 
137 Id.; see also Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co., 726 F.3d 802, 810, 824 (6th Cir. 
2013) (noting that male co-workers never called their female electrical line col-
league by her name but only referred to her as “bitch,” “wench,” or “cunt,” locked 
her in a porta-potty, and mocked her and said that women should not be in their in-
dustry, and that while the jury awarded $400,000 in compensatory damages and 
$7.5 million in punitive damages, the award was limited to recovery of $300,000 
total due to the statutory cap).  
138 See, e.g. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12965(c) (2018) (imposing no caps on compensa-
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IV. SECRECY AGREEMENTS 
“April 20, 2015, the Filipina-Italian model Ambra Battilana Gutierrez sat 
in an office in midtown Manhattan with an eighteen-page legal agreement 
in front of her. She had been advised by her attorney that signing the 
agreement was the best thing for her and her family. In exchange for a mil-
lion-dollar payment from Harvey Weinstein, Gutierrez would agree never to 
talk publicly about an incident during which Weinstein groped her breasts 
and tried to stick his hand up her skirt…Weinstein used nondisclosure 
agreements like the one Gutierrez signed to evade accountability for claims 
of sexual harassment and assault for at least twenty years.”139 
Secrecy agreements occur in sexual harassment cases in two ways. First, 
some employers require employees to agree not to disclose information 
about sexual harassment complaints (or any other type of discrimination) as 
a condition of employment.140 These agreements are signed on the first day 
of work, before anything has happened, and are a condition of employment. 
Because the worker needs the job, they have no ability to reject the agree-
ment. One notorious example was a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) that 
restaurateur Mike Isabella required from his employees.141 According to 
news reports, all employees, including wait staff who were paid $3.33/hour 
                                                                                                             
tory or punitive damages in sexual harassment cases under California’s Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Act); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 297(4)(c) (2018) (providing puni-
tive damages only in housing discrimination claims but allowing for uncapped 
compensatory damages); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.58.020 (2018); Hemmings v. 
Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1196 (9th Cir. 2002) (refusing to use federal caps 
in a state discrimination claim noting “Title VII explicitly prohibits limiting state 
law remedies and that Title VII was not intended to force plaintiffs to choose 
among remedial statutes”); Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 382 F.3d 816, 819, 827 
(8th Cir. 2004) (interpreting IOWA CODE § 216 to cap punitive damages but allow-
ing for compensatory damages higher than the federal cap and allowing the plaintiff 
to amend her Title VII complaint to allege Iowa civil rights violations so as to re-
cover the total amount of compensatory damages of $839,470, but reducing the 
$650,000 in punitive damages to the federal cap of $300,000); Mayo-Coleman v. 
Am. Sugar Holdings, Inc., No. 14-cv-79(PAC), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94821, at 
*6–7, 21 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (allocating $1,699,999 of a jury’s $1.7 million award in 
compensatory damages to the New York State Human Rights Law claim, and $1 to 
the Title VII punitive damages award, and ultimately remitting only $500,000 after 
an excessiveness analysis). 
139 Ronan Farrow, Harvey Weinstein’s Secret Settlements, NEW YORKER (Nov. 21, 
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/harvey-weinsteins-secret-
settlements. 
140 Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA’s), WORKPLACE FAIRNESS, 
https://www.workplacefairness.org/nondisclosure-agreements (last visited Nov. 18, 
2018) [hereinafter NDA’s Workplace Fairness]. 
141 Jack Pointer, Women Suing Mike Isabella Asks Court to Nullify Employee Non-
Disclosure Deals, WTOP (Apr. 4, 2018), https://wtop.com/local/2018/04/woman-
suing-mike-isabella-asks-court-nullify-employee-non-disclosuredeals/. 
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had to sign a non-disclosure agreement as a condition of employment.142 
The penalty for breaking the agreement was $500,000 plus paying the em-
ployer’s attorney’s fees.143 
Some employers’ agreements go as far as to prohibit workers from dis-
cussing discrimination with anyone other than the employer’s representa-
tives.144 These types of employment agreements interfere with an employ-
ee’s right to file an EEOC charge or limit the right to testify, assist, or 
participate in an investigation, hearing, or proceeding of a Title VII claim. 
As such, they violate public policy and are per se retaliatory under Title VII 
because they punish employees for participating in proceedings under the 
statute or opposing conduct made illegal under the statute.145 Although this 
type of NDA should not be used, it can still be effective because it requires 
a worker to be willing to risk challenging it in order for it to be struck 
down. Thus, the better method is that the NDA expressly state that it does 
not apply to reporting discrimination to a government agency.146   
The second method is an NDA as part of a settlement or severance pack-
age.147 Here, the harassment has occurred and, as part of the resolution, the 
worker agrees not to disclose any facts about the case or the settlement.148 
NDA’s at this stage may be in the worker’s interest as they may serve to 
keep facts about the case private, which is what the worker may want. 
NDA’s as part of a settlement also give the worker some amount of lever-
age; the worker’s agreement not to speak about the case may be worth 
something to the employer and thus can be a bargaining chip.   
Both types of agreements are enforceable through penalties against the 
worker.149 As a result, workers who break these agreements by speaking out 
about sexual harassment place themselves in danger of being fined.150 Be-
yond the danger to the individual worker who signs an NDA, NDA’s make 
                                                
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 See NDA’s Workplace Fairness, supra note 140.  
145 See Orley Lobel, NDA’s Are Out of Control. Here’s What Needs to Change, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 30, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/01/ndas-are-out-of-control-
heres-what-needs-to-change. 
146 This is also the better method because NDA’s, whether intentionally or not, can 
be written in a way that a worker would assume that she could not report to gov-
ernment agency. 
147 NDA’s Workplace Fairness, supra note 140. 
148 See id. 
149 See id. 
150 See, e.g., Jessica Levinson, Non-Disclosure Agreements Can Enable Abusers. 
Should We Get Rid of NDAs for Sexual Harassment?, NBC THINK (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/non-disclosure-agreements-can-enable-
abusers-should-we-get-rid-ncna840371. 
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it easy for serial harassers to continue what they are doing. NDA’s also de-
prive workers who are being harassed from banding together both for legal 
reasons and for the emotional support such a group can provide. As a result, 
fewer workers will ever come forward about what has happened to them.  
States have stepped in to limit the use of NDA’s, especially those signed 
as a condition of employment. For example, in just one year: 
• Washington State banned pre-dispute NDA’s that prohibit a 
worker from talking about sexual harassment or sexual assault at 
work.151 The statute does allow for NDA’s as part of a settle-
ment.152 Another new Washington statute states that such NDA’s 
are against public policy if the testimony is needed for a civil ac-
tion.153  
• New York has introduced a bill to ban nondisclosure clauses in 
settlements, agreements, or other resolutions of sexual harass-
ment claims, unless the condition of confidentiality is complain-
ant’s or the plaintiff’s preference.154 The plaintiff also has twen-
ty-one days to consider the nondisclosure agreement, and seven 
days to revoke it.155   
• Tennessee prohibited pre-dispute NDA’s for sex harassment cas-
es.156  
V. RETALIATION 
Title VII prohibits retaliation against those who participate in an investi-
gation under the statute or oppose a practice made illegal under statute.157 
Despite this prohibition, nearly every worker who reaches out to the 
TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund includes allegations of retaliation. For ex-
ample, we have heard from low-wage workers who have had their hours cut 
when they reported sexual harassment; countless women who have been 
passed over for promotions or raises after standing up to sexual harassment 
in their workplaces; low-wage employees working at big box retailers, 
where human resources departments have only allowed employees to trans-
fer to other stores or shifts to avoid their harassers on the condition that they 
                                                
151 S.B. 5996, 65th Leg., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018). 
152 Id. 
153 See S.B. 6068, 65th Leg., 2018 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018). 
154 S.B. 7848-A, 2018 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018).  
155 Id.  
156 Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-108 (2018). 
157 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2018). 
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withdraw their complaints or reports of harassment; and a worker who was 
fired two hours after telling her employer that she had contacted the EEOC. 
Similarly, the EEOC reports that retaliation is regularly the most frequently 
filed charge with the agency.158   
The burden of proof in a typical retaliation case follows a three-step pro-
cess. First, the worker makes out a prima facie case of retaliation.159 Then, 
the employer has the burden of producing a legitimate non-discriminatory 
reason for its actions.160 The plaintiff then has the burden of proof to show 
that that the real reason for the action was discriminatory.161   
Likewise, the prima facie case of retaliation has three parts. First, the 
worker shows that she participated in the investigation or opposed a prac-
tice made unlawful under Title VII.162 The employee only has to have a 
reasonable good faith belief that the conduct opposed is unlawful; it is not 
required that the opposed conduct actually be illegal.163 This is critical for 
workers facing sexual harassment because what qualifies as illegal sex har-
assment has to pass certain tests (see Part II).164   
Second, the worker has to show that she suffered a materially adverse ac-
tion as result of her participation or opposition.165 “Materially adverse ac-
tions” are anything that “might well deter a reasonable employee from 
complaining about discrimination.”166 Importantly, this standard is lower 
than what a worker must show in a claim of discrimination, which requires 
an “adverse action” (which usually is linked to losing pay, not being hired, 
being fired).167  Additionally, courts are supposed to take into account the 
specific worker and how the retaliation affected that person or, as the Su-
preme Court stated, “[c]ontext matters.”168 As an example of the type of 
                                                
158 Press Release, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (Jan. 25, 2019), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-25-18.cfm (showing that in 2017, 
retaliation accounted for 41,097 charges or 48.8% of the workplace discrimination 
charges filed). 
159 Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252–53 (1981). 
160 Id. at 253. 
161 Id. 
162 See, e.g., Foster v. Univ. of Maryland - E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 250 (4th Cir. 
2015) (stating that a plaintiff must show that he or she engaged in protected activi-
ty). 
163 See, e.g., Villa v. CavaMezze Grill, LLC, 858 F.3d 896, 901 (4th Cir. 2017). 
164 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787–88 (explaining that, to qualify as severe or perva-
sive, “conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions 
of employment…”). 
165 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 54 (2006); see Foster, 
787 F.3d at 250.  
166 White, 548 U.S. at 69.  
167 Id. at 68. 
168 Id. 
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context courts should consider, the Supreme Court offered this example: 
“[a] schedule change in an employee’s work schedule may make little dif-
ference to many workers, but may matter enormously to a young mother 
with school-age children.”169 
Third, the worker must link the retaliation to her opposition or participa-
tion.170 Workers frequently do so by showing the proximity in time between 
the opposition or participation and the retaliation.171 If a worker makes out 
this prima facie case, the employer then has the burden of production (not 
proof) to show that the adverse action was not retaliatory.172   
Retaliation is especially dangerous in low-wage jobs. Workers in these 
jobs are seen as interchangeable and able to be replaced at low cost.173 At 
the same time, these workers usually do not have savings or other ways to 
pay for rent, housing, food, or transportation.174 Thus, loss of a job can push 
an entire family deeper into poverty and instability. Given the danger of re-
taliation for low-wage workers and its prevalence, what is needed is a 
change in the law.   
First, Title VII should be changed to allow for retaliation cases to use a 
mixed motive method of proof. Currently, a worker can win a Title VII case 
of discrimination if she shows that the protected characteristic was a moti-
vating factor in the employer’s decision making, although the damages that 
can be received are limited.175 For retaliation cases, however, the mixed 
motive method of proof does not apply.176   
Second, once a worker makes out the prima facie case of retaliation, the 
full burden of proof, rather than merely the burden of production, should be 
on the employer to show that the adverse actions were not retaliatory. Es-
sentially, this would allow individual cases of retaliation to use the preva-
lence of retaliation overall to establish that retaliation is the pattern or prac-
tice of all employers.177 Then, as in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 
                                                
169 Id. 
170 Foster, 787 F.3d at 250. 
171 See id. at 253. 
172 Id. at 250. 
173 Karen Turner, The Unique Challenges That Low-Wage Women Face When 
They’re Sexually Harassed at Work, VOX (Apr. 6, 2017), 
https://www.vox.com/conversations/2017/4/5/15190448/sexual-harassment-fox-
bill-oreilly-trump. 
174 See id. 
175 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2018). 
176 See University of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nasser, 570 U.S. 338, 359–60 (2013). 
177 Under Teamsters, through statistics and anecdotal evidence, a plaintiff can show 
a pattern or practice of discrimination. Once such as showing is made, in the reme-
dy phase, the burden of proof switches to the employer to show that specific actions 
taken about a specific plaintiff were not made based on this pattern. International 
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the employer would have the burden of proof to show that it did not act in 
accordance with this pattern or practice.178 While employers will undoubta-
bly claim that this is not fair to them, the overwhelming prevalence of retal-
iation and the danger it poses both to workers and to the willingness of 
workers to come forward requires this change be made.  
CONCLUSION 
For many workers, especially low-wage workers, sexual harassment has 
been a constant, dangerous problem that forces workers to choose to stay in 
unsafe, demeaning, and threatening conditions to survive. The renewed at-
tention to sexual harassment in the workplace has led to thousands of work-
ers – most of whom are women – sharing their stories of harassment on and 
offline and taking to the streets and to statehouses across the country to de-
mand change.179 While there is a long way to go, we have seen some wins, 
including concrete legislative gains for workers at the state level and the 
funding of new organizations, like the TIME’S UP Legal Defense Fund, 
that can help individuals respond to workplace sexual harassment. 180 These 
positive changes need to work their way into the federal law and change our 
culture so that all working people can earn the money they need without 
facing sexual harassment and retaliation. 
  
                                                                                                             
Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 359 (1977). 
178 Id. 
179 See Zoe Greenberg, What Has Actually Changed In a Year, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/06/opinion/Sunday/What-
Has-Actually-Changed-in-a-year-me-too.html. 
180 ANDREA JOHNSON ET AL., NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., #METOO ONE YEAR 
LATER: PROGRESS IN CATALYZING CHANGE TO END WORKPLACE HARASSMENT 1, 6 
(2018),https://nwlc-ciw49tixgw5lbab.stackpathdns.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/MeToo-Factsheet.pdf. 
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